Welfare Impacts of Alternative Public Policies for Environmental Protection in Agriculture in an Open Economy: A General Equilibrium Framework by Taheripour, Farzad et al.
 
 
Welfare Impacts of Alternative Public Policies for Environmental Protection in Agriculture 
in an Open Economy: A General Equilibrium Framework 
 
 




Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the American Economic Association Annul 








University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign 
402 Mumford Hall, MC-710 
1301 West Gregory Drive 
Urbana, IL, 61801 
Tel: (217) 333-3417 





Copyright 2005 by Farzad Taheripour, Madhu Khanna, and Chares H. Nelson. All rights 
reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this paper document for non-commercial 
purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.  
 
† Farzad Taheripour is Ph.D. candidate, Madhu Khanna is associate professor, and Charles H. Nelson is associate 
professor in the Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.   
  Welfare Impacts of Alternative Public Policies for Environmental Protection in Agriculture 
in an Open Economy: A General Equilibrium Framework 
Abstract 
This paper uses stylized analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to evaluate 
the welfare impacts of alternative policies for reducing nitrogen run-off from agricultural 
production in an open economy while recognizing the presence of distortionary agricultural 
support subsidies and factor income taxes. The alternative policies examined here are a nitrogen 
run-off tax, a nitrogen run-off reduction subsidy, a tax on the production of agricultural goods, a 
“two-part” instrument - a combination of the second and the third policies, and land retirement. 
The paper uses an analytical model to express the welfare impacts of each policy into several 
components and compares these components across alternative policies. From the analytical 
model the paper concludes that all alternative policies, except land retirement, may generate a 
double dividend because they reduce the provision of distortionary agricultural support subsidies 
and because a part of the burden of these policies can be passed on to foreign consumers of 
agricultural products through the world market. The numerical results indicate that all policies, 
except for land retirement, generate some welfare gains at low levels of nitrogen reduction 
targets in the first and second best settings when nitrogen and other inputs are substitutable. 
Gains are higher in the second best setting. As the level of nitrogen reduction increases, all 
policies become costly and they impose net welfare costs. These costs are higher in the second 
best setting. The numerical results also indicate that the relative efficiency of alternative policies 
is sensitive to the level of nitrogen reduction target.  
Keywords: Environmental instrument choice; Agricultural pollution; Agricultural support 
subsidies, Agricultural exports, Second best regulation 
  21. Introduction 
According to the Uruguay Round Agreement and more recent multilateral trade negations in 
Doha, the World Trade Organization (WTO) members committed to limiting their agricultural 
support subsidies that distort production and trade of agricultural products (Ingo and Nash, 
2004). In compliance with this limit and in response to the public concerns over the harmful 
environmental consequences of agricultural products, the US government has been making some 
reforms in the agricultural support subsidies. These reforms which are reflected in the Farm 
Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) of 2002 seeks to reduce distortionary agricultural 
support subsidies, increase decoupled support payments to farmers, and allocate more funds for 
environmental protection programs in agriculture (Westcott et al., 2002). These reforms are 
likely to have significant environmental and welfare impacts on the US economy. This paper 
develops stylized analytical and numerical general equilibrium models based on the theory of 
environmental regulation in the second best setting
1 in the context of an open economy to 
examine and quantify the magnitude of these impacts. 
A second best setting is selected here because the government finances substantial agricultural 
subsidies through distortionary taxes. The USDA has paid about $114 billion to farmers through 
the conservation and commodity support programs between the calendar years 1995 and 2002
2. 
The WTO classified domestic support subsidies into three categories: amber, blue and green. 
Based on the WTO agreements, the amber box subsidies were considered as the most production 
and trade distorting payments, because they provide incentives to increase agricultural 
production. In 2000, about 73 percent of the US agricultural subsidies were classified under the 
amber box (Young et al., 2002). While the US is moving towards decoupled payment, there are 
still many agricultural commodities whose production the government supports through 
distortionary subsidies. In the FSRIA of 2002, these include, but are not restricted to price 
support subsidies, crop insurance indemnities, and market loss assistance payments. The USDA 
has classified these items under the amber box (Westcott et al., 2002). The FSRIA also allocates 
some funds for decoupled subsidies such as countercyclical payments. Some economists believe 
that these payments are indeed not decoupled from production (Young and Westcott, 2000).    
                                                           
1 Throughout this paper, the term “second best” refers to a setting with prior distortionary income and commodity 
taxes/subsidies.   
2 For more information on agricultural subsidies see EWG Farm Subsidy Database at http://www.ewg.org. 
  3Claassen et al. (2004) indicates that agricultural support subsidies have the potential to adversely 
affect water quality. According to this paper acres with high potential for nutrient run-off and 
leaching are located mostly in areas with relatively high government commodity payments. The 
paper also shows that fertilizer application accounts for more than 48 percent of all nitrogen 
loadings to surface water in areas where nitrogen run-off per unit of land is high and for more 
than 20 percent where run-off is low.  
An obvious way to reduce agricultural pollution would then be to reduce distortionary 
agricultural subsidies. This would also reduce the need to raise revenue through distortionary 
income taxes. For these reasons reduction in agricultural subsidies can improve social welfare. 
However, a complete reduction in agricultural subsidies may not be possibly feasible or efficient 
to achieve desired environmental objectives. A reduction in subsidies may have to be 
supplemented with other environmental policies such as a nitrogen tax or a nitrogen reduction 
subsidy. While the reduction in distortionary agricultural subsidies would raise welfare, 
environmental policies may impose costs on the economy. Since the US is a large exporter of 
agricultural products, it is possible to shift some of the burden of environmental policies through 
higher prices to foreign consumers
3. We therefore, examine the impacts of various combinations 
of domestic subsidy and environmental policies in the context of an open economy. In particular, 
the policies we look are a nitrogen run-off tax, a nitrogen run-off reduction subsidy, a tax on crop 
production, a “two-part instrument” - a combination of the second and the third policies, and 
land retirement.  
Using analytical and numerical general equilibrium models the paper shows that all alternative 
policies to reduce nitrogen-runoff, except for land retirement, may generate a double dividend 
because they reduce the provision of distortionary agricultural support subsidies and because a 
part of the burden of these policies can be passed on to foreign consumers of agricultural 
products through the world market. Using an extended definition of equivalent variation the 
paper ranks alternative policies at different levels of nitrogen reduction targets and shows that the 
tax on production of the agricultural good is the most efficient policy at lower levels of nitrogen 
                                                           
3 Since the US is a largest exporter of agricultural products in the world, its domestic agri-environmental policies 
have the potential to affect prices of these commodities in the world market (Sumner 2003). 
  4reduction targets, but it is the worst one at higher levels. The paper also indicates that suggested 
budget reforms are welfare enhancing.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the analytical 
general equilibrium model and decomposes welfare impacts of alternative policies. Section 4 
describes the numerical model and simulation results. Section 5 contains sensitivity analyses. 
The final section presents the conclusions.  
2. Literature Review 
This paper is built on the theory of environmental regulation in the presence of pre-
existing distortionary taxes. This theory has been an attractive subject in the field of 
environmental economics in the past three decades. Two important and parallel issues have been 
discussed in this field. Several papers study optimal commodity taxation in the presence of 
externalities (pollution). These papers show that the interaction between environmental taxes and 
pre-existing income taxes can affect social costs of environmental regulation
4. Some papers have 
been built on this finding to study if environmental levies can generate a “double dividend”. 
Existence of a double dividend is a controversial debate among environmental economists. Early 
papers in this field argue that revenues from environmental levies can be used to cut 
distortionary income taxes and improve efficiency
5. This is known as the “revenue recycling 
effect”. These papers argue that the revenue recycling effect generate some gains over and above 
the environmental benefits and create a “double-dividend”. More recent papers in this field show 
that the interaction between environmental levies and pre-existing taxes decreases economic 
efficiency
6. This is known as the “tax interaction effect”. These papers reject the double-
dividend hypothesis and indicate that the welfare reducing tax interaction effect offsets the 
welfare enhancing revenue recycling effect.    
The choice between alternative policies for environmental regulation in a second best setting is 
also an important issue in this field. Several papers have applied analytical and numerical general 
equilibrium models to study cost effectiveness of air pollution regulation programs and carbon 
                                                           
4 Examples: Sandmo (1975), Bovenberg and Mooij (1994), Fullerton (1997), Schöb (1997), Cramer, Gahvari, and 
Ladoux (2001), and Metcalf and NBER (2003). 
5 Examples: Terkla (1984), Lee and Misiolek (1986), Baumol and Oates (1988), Oates (1991), and Pearce (1991). 
6 Examples: Bovenberg and Mooij (1994), Fullerton and Metcalf (1997), Fullerton (1997), and Goulder et al. (1999). 
  5taxes policies
7. In these papers, alternative policies are typically an emissions tax, a set of 
emissions permits, a tax on production of fuels, and the command and control policies. These 
papers show that the emissions tax can be more efficient than other policies in the second best 
setting if environmental tax revenues are used to reduce other distortionary taxes.  
Most papers which reject the double dividend hypothesis and those which study the choice 
between alternative policies for air pollution regulation in the second best setting are constructed 
on a “classical structure”, which relies on the following simplifying assumptions:  first, labor is 
the only primary input; second, there is only one pre-existing distortion in the economy - either a 
tax on labor or a commodity tax; third, the abatement technology is separable from the 
production technology, also known as the “end-of-pipe” abatement technology assumption; and 
fourth, the economy is closed.  
Relaxing these assumptions can provide different results. Introducing more primary inputs into 
the model, existence of distortionary subsidies, links between domestic environmental policies 
and terms of trade are key factors that can affect cost effectiveness of alternative policies to 
control pollution and increase possibility of gaining a double dividend from environmental 
regulation. In this paper, we remove these restricting assumptions.  
This paper removes restricting assumptions. It expands the space of primary inputs and includes 
essential inputs land, capital, and nitrogen fertilizer into the model. This modification makes 
substitution between primary inputs possible and improves reliability of the analytical and 
numerical results significantly
8. Unlike the classical structure where the pre-existing 
distortionary labor tax is the focal point, this paper makes the interaction between the agri-
environmental subsidies and the tax system the center of attention
9. The “end of pipe” abatement 
technology is not an appropriate assumption in agriculture. It is not possible to separate 
abatement activities from production in agriculture. Hence, this paper does not separate these 
activities and define pollution as a part of production technology. Finally, since the US exports a 
large portion of its agricultural products to the world market and its domestic agri-environmental 
                                                           
7 Examples: Ballard and Medema (1993), Parry (1997), Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1997), Parry, Williams, and 
Goulder (1998), and Goulder et al. (1999). 
8 For more discussion about this modification and its consequences see (Taheripour 2005). 
9 Shah and Larson (1992) in a partial equilibrium framework showed that, in the presence of subsidies on fossil 
fuels, carbon taxes generate a double dividend. 
  6policies have the potential to affect prices of agricultural products in the world market, this paper 
evaluates welfare impacts of these policies through the trade channel
10 as well.  
3. The Analytical Model 
Consider an open economy with one representative consumer, two producers, and a 
regulator. Each producer produces only one final good. Hence, there are two final goods: A dirty 
good (crops) and a clean good (other goods and services). Output of the dirty and the clean good 
and their consumer prices are indicated with X, Y, , and , respectively.   X p Y p
The resources used in production of both goods are labor, land, and capital. Endowments of these 
resources are indicated withL ,R , andK , respectively, and they are fixed. The wage rate, w, is 
selected as the numeraire. Prices of land and capital are indicated with and , respectively. 
The dirty good uses nitrogen fertilizer in its production process as well.  
R r K r
The economy imports nitrogen fertilizer, ,   at a constant price of  X N N p and exports some parts of 
agricultural product,x , at the domestic price of . Indeed, we assume free trade with no tariff. 
The demand for export,
X p
( ) X x p , is downward sloping, with a constant price elasticity of  x ε . The 
balance of this trade, RES, can be positive or negative and is defined as follows:  
 () NX X X RES p N p x p +=    (3-1) 
Land and capital are fully utilized. However, the consumer consumes some parts of labor 
endowments as leisure. Domestic markets are all competitive and agents are price takers.  
3.1. The Representative Consumer  
The representative consumer derives utility from consumption of goods, leisure, and 
foreign reserve and disutility from environmental damages due to nitrogen run-off from 
production of the dirty good, E. The utility function is given by:  
  .   (3-2)  (,, )( )(
dd Uu XYl E R E S φϕ =− + )
In this utility function X
d and Y
d indicate domestic demands for the dirty and the clean goods 
respectively, lLL =−is leisure and L is labor supply. In this utility function: u(.) is increasing 
                                                           
10 Proost and Regemorter (2004) claim that an increase in the price of an exporting dirty good due to environmental 
  7in consumption of both goods and leisure and is quasi-concave;  ) (E φ is increasing in nitrogen 
run-off and is weakly convex; and  () RES ϕ is increasing in reserves and is weakly concave. The 
representative consumer takes E and RES as given. In this utility function we consider reserves 
as an opportunity to import other goods from the world market. Alternatively, we can interpret 
reserves as an unintended public asset/debt. The representative consumer takes RES and E as 
given. These variables do not affect the choice between consumption and leisure and between 
consumption of the dirty and the clean goods because the above utility function is strongly 
separable in E and RES. 
The consumer supplies labor, land, and capital and receives a lump sum transfer, G, from the 
government. The consumer budget constraint is defined as follows: 
  (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
dd
XY L R R K K RES p X p Y t L t r R t r K G π + + =− +− +− ++.   (3-3)   
Where , , and are flat tax rates on labor, land, and capital incomes respectively and L t R t K t π stands 
for profit from production activities if there is any. For simplicity assume there is no tax on 
profits and transfer payments. The following demands for goods, the supply of labor and the 
indirect utility function, V, can be derived from the utility maximization:     
( , ,(1 ),(1 ),(1 ), , , , , , )
d
XY L R KR K XX p p t t t r r R K G π =− − − ,     (3-4) 
( , ,(1 ),(1 ),(1 ), , , , , , )
d
XY L R KR K YY p p t t t r r R K G π =− − − ,     (3-5) 
( , ,(1 ),(1 ),(1 ), , , , , , ) XY L R KR K LL pp t t t r r R K G π =− − − ,     (3-6) 
( , ,(1 ),(1 ),(1 ), , , , , , ) ( ) ( ) XY L R KR K Vv pp t t tr r R K G E R E S πφ ϕ =− − − − + . (3-7) 
3.2. Producers and Production Functions 
Production functions are assumed to be constant returns to scale (CRS) and they are 
represented as follows: 
 (,, , XX X X ) X XL R K N = ,   (3-8) 
  .    (3-9)  (,, ) YY Y YY L R K =
                                                                                                                                                                                           
regulation may shift the burden of regulation to citizens of other countries. 
  8Due to the assumption of CRS, the marginal and average cost functions of each good are equal to 
each other, and are represented below as functions of input prices: 
  ,    (3-10)  (,, ) XX R K N CC r r p =
  .    (3-11)  (,) YY K R CC r r =
Where  and  are the marginal costs of the clean and the dirty goods respectively. The wage 
rate is the numeraire and hence it is drooped from the marginal cost functions.  
X C Y C
Since markets are competitive, prices equal marginal costs in the absence of regulations:  
 (,, ) XX R K N p Cr rp = ,    (3-12) 
 (,) YY K R p Crr = .    (3-13) 
Competitive markets and constant returns to scale technologies impose zero profits in both 
sectors in the absence of regulation.  
In equilibrium, the supply of the clean good must equal its domestic demand and the supply of 
the dirty good must equal its domestic demand plus exports. That is:  




X ) X Xx p =+        (3-15) 
Furthermore, market clearing conditions for the primary and intermediate inputs should also be 
satisfied.   
3.3. The Nitrogen Run-Off Function 
In general, nitrogen run-off is a function of soil characteristics, H, climatic conditions, M, 
nutrient management technology, T, and applied nitrogen for crop production. We can 
summarize the relationship between these variables at a macro level with the following function:  
(, ,, ) X EE H M T N = . 
To avoid complexity we assume () E ⋅  is a linear homogenous function in Nx. this assumption 
implies that:  
    ( , , ) X EH M T N ψ = . 
  9Since we use an aggregated static general equilibrium model with a representative consumer and 
a representative crop producer and because our model is abstract from random variables it is 
reasonable to assume that H, M, and T are constant and given variables. This means that  () ψ ⋅  is 
a constant parameter in our model. Indeed, in our model ψ  is a constant delivery coefficient 
which transfers applied nitrogen to nitrogen run-off. In short, the nitrogen run-off function is 
given by:  
  X EN ψ = .    (3-16) 
3.4. Alternative Policies 
We examine five regulation policies to reduce nitrogen run-off from crop production. 
These policies are a nitrogen run-off tax (policy I), a nitrogen run-off reduction subsidy (policy 
II), a tax on the production of the dirty good (policy III), a “two-part instrument”
11 (policy IV) - a 
combination of the second and the third policies, and land retirement (policy V). We use the two-
part instrument to study a revenue neutral policy that reduce distortionary agricultural support 
subsidies and allocate released funds to subsidize activities that reduce nitrogen run-off. 
Notice that since we assume a liner homogenous relationship between applied nitrogen and 
nitrogen run-off and because there is no heterogeneity in the model, we can replace the tax on 
nitrogen run-off with a tax on applied nitrogen. For the same reason we can replace the nitrogen 
run-off reduction subsidy with a subsidy per unit of reduction in applied nitrogen.  
3.5. The Government 
The government has several regulatory functions. It supports production of the dirty good 
through a subsidy per unit of output, So, and seeks to control nitrogen run-off. The government 
also taxes incomes and pays a lump-sum transfer, G, to the consumer. The government is 
committed to a certain level of real lump-sum transfer. Therefore, it adjusts G with changes in 
                                                           
11 It is well known that sources of agricultural pollution are not observable and monitoring the movements of 
nonpoint-source pollution is often impractical or too expensive. Fullerton (1997) suggests a simple remedy for this 
problem. He shows that, when sources of pollution are not observable, the emissions tax can be entirely replaced 
by the equivalent combination of a subsidy to all clean inputs plus an additional tax on output. Based on this 
suggestion, a reduction in the price support subsidies can be interpreted as an additional tax on agricultural output.  
Furthermore, those government subsidies which encourage farmers to use environmental friendly practices (such as 
green payments) can be considered as a subsidy on the clean input. Notice that, in this paper, a subsidy on clean 
inputs is replaced by a nitrogen reduction subsidy.  
  10the prices of consumption goods. At equilibrium government revenues must equal government 
expenditure under all alternative policies.  
3.6. Definitions 
To express results in short terms, we define the partial equilibrium marginal costs of 
public funds (MCPF) from the labor tax as follows: 




















= .   (3-17) 





















= ′ = .   (3-18) 
Where superscript of C indicates compensated derivative of labor supply with respect to the 
labor tax. Notice that these measures are basically distinguishing between the compensated and 
uncompensated labor supply elasticities. Finally, I define the share of lump-sum transfer in total 
income of the representative consumer with the following expression: 
 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
G
LR R K K
G
S
tL tr R tr K G π
=
−+ − + − + +
.   (3-19) 
We finally defineλ as the consumer’s marginal utility of income. 
3.7. The Welfare Impacts of Alternative Policies 
This section provides second order welfare assessments of alternative policies. We first 
disaggregate welfare impacts of alternative policies into several components and then we 
compare similar components across alternative policies to examine their cost effectiveness. 
3.7.1. The Nitrogen Run-Off Tax  
  11Assume nitrogen run-off is observable and the government uses tax on nitrogen run-off to 
reduce this pollution. Consider a revenue-neutral tax imposed on each unit of nitrogen run-off
12. 
The government uses revenues from this tax to cut only tax on labor
13. Under this policy the 
government budget constraint is as follows:  
G X S K r t R r t L t E t o K K R R L E + = + + + .   (3-20)   
And the consumer price of the dirty good is equal to: 
(,, ) XX R K N Eo p Cr rp t S ψ =+ − .     (3-21) 
Consider now an incremental increase in the nitrogen run-off tax rate. To examine welfare 
impacts of this policy, we first derived total differentiation of the utility function with respect to 
tE. Then we found components of this equation through different steps. In these steps we used 
equations (3-1) and (3-3) through (3-21) to trace welfare impacts of the policy from all markets. 
In this process we applied Slutsky equation and Shepard’s lemma to shrink final result into 
compact components
14. Equation (3-22) shows the final result. In this equation each positive 
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   (3-22) 
                                                           
E t
12 Alternatively, the government can impose a tax rate of  N t ψ = on consumption of nitrogen. These two tax 
policies are identical in this economy. For details see Taheripour (2005). 
  12The first component which is labeled primary Pigouvian effect is well known in the literature 
and indicates the primary (marginal) costs of nitrogen run-off reduction
15. The negative primary 
Pigouvian effect contains efficiency costs of two types of substitutions in the economy: 
substituting away from nitrogen fertilizer to other inputs in production of the dirty good and 
substituting away from consumption of the dirty good to the clean good and leisure. The first 
substitution effect reduces applied nitrogen per unit of output of the dirty good and the second 
one reduces consumption of the dirty good.   
The second component which is labeled primary trade effect has three subcomponents. The first 
subcomponent measures changes in the export value of the dirty good due to an increase in . 
This term is positive when the price elasticity of demand for the dirty good in the world market, 
E t
x ε , is less than one. In this case an increase in  decreases export volume but increases export 
value. Since the US is a large exporter of agricultural products, in the rest of this paper we 
assume
E t
1 x ε < . The second subcomponent measures changes in the utility of reserves due to an 











increase in the nitrogen run-off tax raises reserves because it reduces consumption of nitrogen 
and raises export value of the dirty good. Therefore, when the marginal utility of reserves is high, 
more than one, then the second component also is positive and improves welfare. Otherwise the 
second component is welfare reducing. Finally, the third subcomponent measures an increase in 
the utility due to diverted exports to domestic consumption. 




≥  then the trade effect is welfare enhancing because a part 
of the burden of the tax on nitrogen run-off is moved to the rest of the world. The overall primary 
impact of the nitrogen run-off tax in the first best setting depends on the magnitudes of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 It is straight forward to consider tax cut on other inputs. For a case with tax cut on other inputs see Taheripour 
(2005).  
14 More details on these steps are provided in Taheripour (2005).  
15 For a large amount of change in tE, this primary effect is equal to the familiar loss triangle. This means: 










⎝⎠ ∫ / 2 . 
  13primary effects. When the primary Pigouvian effect is less than the primary trade effect then it is 
possible to experience a double dividend in the first best setting. 
The third component which is labeled price support effect reflects gains due to reduction in total 
payments for agricultural support subsidies. This term equals the product of the marginal cost of 
public funds and reduction in agricultural support subsidies due to reduction in production of the 
dirty good. This effect indeed indicates that an increase in  reduces the efficiency cost of 
agricultural subsidies. This is consistent with the conclusion of Lichtenberg and Zilberman 
(1986). They showed that pre-existing regulation reduces the cost of environmental regulation. 
Later on, I will show that when the magnitude of the price support effect is large enough it can 
also generate a double-dividend. 
E t
The fourth component which is labeled revenue recycling effect measures gains due to the labor 
tax cut. This secondary effect has three subcomponents. The first subcomponent shows the 
marginal revenues from an increase in  . The second and the third subcomponents measure the 
marginal revenues from changes in the prices of land and capital due to an increase in  . When 
nitrogen fertilizer and other inputs are substitutable, then an increase in the run-off tax raises the 
prices of land and capital eventually. Recall that labor is the numeraire good and wage rate 
equals one. This means that an increase in   raises government revenues from tax on land and 
capital as well. When the government uses new revenues to cut the tax rate on labor it decreases 




The fifth component which is labeled tax interaction effect reflects the efficiency costs due to 
interaction between changes in the prices of goods and the labor tax rate. This component has 
two major subcomponents. The first subcomponent is the tax interaction effect due to changes in 
the price of the dirty good. This is a positive and welfare reducing item, because the nitrogen 
run-off tax raises the price of the dirty good. The second subcomponent is the tax interaction 
effect due to changes in the price of the clean good. The sign of this subcomponent depends on 
the direction of changes in the price of the clean good. The price of the clean good is increasing 
in the price of capital and land. Hence, when prices of both capital and land go up then the price 
of the clean good also increases. This makes the overall tax interaction stronger. However, if the 
  14price of either capital or land decreases then the price of the clean good does not significantly 
change and it moderates the overall tax interaction effect.   
The sixth component which is labeled income replacement effect reflects the impacts of the 
policy on the labor supply due to changes in the prices of land and capital. As discussed earlier, 
when nitrogen fertilizer and other inputs are substitutable, then an increase in  eventually raises 
the prices of land and capital. This means that an increase in  may raise share of non-labor 
income in the total income of the consumer. More rents discourage labor supply
16. In this case, 
the sign of the income replacement effect is negative and welfare reducing. That is not the case 
when fertilizer and other inputs are not substitutable. Indeed, in a model with only one primary 
input the income replacement effect does not exist.   
E t
E t
We now explain how pre-existing taxes and the agricultural support subsidies together affect the 
whole cost of the nitrogen run-off tax. For simplification we assume that  and  R t K t equal zero. In 
addition assume that and that the economy does not export and hence there are no 
reserves. Under these simplifying assumptions equation (3-22) shrinks to equation (3-23). In this 
equation a letter mane is assigned to each effect and some effects are split into two terms. Notice 
that the trade effect is dropped from this equation because it is assumed that the world price of 
fertilizer is zero and the economy does not export.    
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     (3-23) 





E o ) A BCD D E d t +++ + + ∫ . Define 
E t
E o A Adt ∆= ∫ and so on for other terms. 
                                                           
16 Numerical results verify this argument.  
  15Given these definitions, the ratio of the whole cost of the nitrogen run-off tax relative to the 
primary cost is:  
       
12 A CD BD E
A AA
∆+ ∆+ ∆ ∆ ∆ + ∆
++
∆∆ ∆ .   (3-24) 
Now, for a moment, suppose that labor is the only primary input in the model and the 
agricultural support subsidy does not exist. Also, assume that in the absence of regulation, all 
















Since M is positive, this means that the overall cost of the policy is larger than the primary cost. 
Hence, in the absence of the price support program, when there is only one primary input in the 
model, a double dividend does not exist.  
Now we return land and capital to the model, remove the unit price assumption and maintain the 
















depends on the direction of changes in 















is positive as 










, or both 
is/are negative then there is a chance to observe a double dividend.   





is large enough, it is 





is negative. This is an important 
result which indicates that the nitrogen run-off tax in the presence of a price support program can 





depends on the 
amount of subsidies per unit of output and the size of changes in the production of the dirty good 
due to changes in the nitrogen run-off tax rate. 





≥ , then the trade effect is welfare enhancing and the tax on nitrogen run-off may 
generate a double dividend. .  
In conclusion, the primary trade effect and the price support effect are two welfare improving 
items that can offset all or some parts of welfare reducing effects. When they offset all welfare 
reducing effects, a double dividend will occur.      
3.7.2. The Nitrogen Run-Off Reduction Subsidy - the Nitrogen Reduction Subsidy   
Traditionally, agricultural environmental regulation in the US has been supported by the 
government subsidies. Environmental subsidies are paid in different ways to encourage farmers 
to reduce pollution. The 2002 Farm Act allows the government to assist crop producers with 
conservation and environmental improvement on working land. Under this act cost sharing or 
incentive payments can be provided for a range of practices including but not restricted to 
nutrient management, conservation tillage (Westcott et al., 2002). Here, we study welfare 
impacts of these payments.  
Suppose that the nitrogen run-off is observable and the government pays some subsidies, , per 
unit of reduction in nitrogen run-off to improve water quality
17. In addition, suppose the 
government pays subsidies per unit of output of the dirty good. It pays transfer payments as well. 
Subsidies and transfer payments are financed from taxes on all sources of income. The 
government budget constraint in this case is: 
a S
0 () LR RK K o a tL trR trK SX S E E G ++ = + − + . (3-25) 
Here,  represents the total amount of nitrogen run-off in the absence of environmental 
regulation. Other variables were defined earlier. Under this policy the price of the dirty good is:  
0 E
(,, ) XX R K N ao p Cr rp S S ψ =+ − .      ( 3 - 2 6 )  
The key difference between the nitrogen run-off reduction subsidy and the tax on nitrogen run-
off is that the former policy raises the government expenditures. In addition, it generates some 
  17rents equal to 0 a SE π =  for the producer of the dirty good. Consider now an incremental increase 
in the nitrogen run-off reduction subsidy. Welfare impacts of this change are expressed into 
several components in equation (3-27). In this equation it is assumed that the government does 
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   (3-27)   
A comparison of (3-22) with (3-27) indicates that in the latter equation 0 EE −  is replaced with E. 






in the income replacement effect. Other 
corresponding components and terms in these equations look similar.  
Principally, the nitrogen run-off tax and the nitrogen run-off reduction subsidy have similar 
impacts on producers’ resource allocation decisions. However, the former policy is more 
efficient than the latter one for two main reasons. Under the latter policy the government raises 
income tax rates, because it needs more revenue to finance the policy. If the government raises 
revenues from the labor tax, it generates efficiency costs. Indeed, this policy generates a reveres 
revenue recycling effect. In addition, the subsidy policy reduces labor supply more than the tax 
policy. Notice that both policies discourage labor supply because they reduce the real wage. 
However, the subsidy policy generates some rents which reduce labor supply more.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Na S
17 Alternatively, the government can pay S ψ = on each unit of reduction in consumption of nitrogen. These 
two subsidy policies are identical in this economy. For details see Taheripour (2005)  
  183.7.3 Tax on Output of the Dirty Good - Reduction in Subsidies per Unit of Output  
Suppose the government levies a flat tax rate, , on each unit of output of the dirty good 
to reduce nitrogen run-off
18. The government uses revenues from this tax to reduce income taxes. 
Under this policy the government budget constraint would be equal to: 
X t
XL R R K K o tX tL trR trK SX G ++ + = + . (3-28) 
The key difference between the nitrogen run-off tax and the tax on output of the dirty good is 
that the latter policy does not affect the farmer’s resource allocation decision because it does not 
change the price of nitrogen. Therefore, the farmer does not reduce applied nitrogen per unit of 
output. In this case the price of the dirty good is equal to:  
(,, ) XX R K N X o p Cr rp t S =+ − .   (3-29) 
Consider now an incremental increase in the tax on output of the dirty good. Welfare impacts of 
this change are expressed into several components in equation (3-30). In this equation it is 
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(3-30) 
A comparison of (3-22) with (3-30) indicates that the nitrogen run-off tax and the output tax 
generate different primary Pigouvian effects. In addition, they are different in their revenue 
                                                           
18 This policy can be considered as a reduction in the distortionary agricultural subsidies as well. 
  19recycling effects. Other corresponding components and terms look similar. The differences 
between the welfare impacts of these policies are discussed in detail in the rest of this subsection. 
As argued before, the nitrogen run-off tax reduces run-off from two channels: from reduction in 
used nitrogen per unit of output and from reduction in consumption of the dirty good. Contrary 
to the nitrogen run-off tax, the output tax does not raise the price of nitrogen run-off. Therefore, 
it does not reduce used nitrogen per unit of output. However, it increases the price of the dirty 
good sharply which eventually reduces its demand. Reduction in demand forces less production 
of the dirty good which eventually leads to less nitrogen run-off. These arguments can be used to 
conclude that the tax on output generates higher primary costs than the tax on nitrogen run-off 
because the former policy causes a larger reduction in consumer surplus.   
While the tax on output generates higher primary Pigouvian costs, it generates larger trade gains, 
because the price of the dirty good grows faster under this policy. Compared to the tax on 
nitrogen run-off, reduction in the production of the dirty good is larger under the tax on 
production. Hence, this policy drives up the price of the dirty good faster and generates more 
gains from trade channel.  
In short, in the first best setting, whether the tax on the output of the dirty good is more or less 
efficient than the nitrogen run-off tax depends on the magnitudes of the primary Pigouvian and 
the trade effects of these policies.  










< . This means that the tax on output of the dirty good generates a higher price 
support effect which is an advantage for this policy in the second best. In addition, this policy 
generates a larger revenues recycling effect, because it raises the government revenues faster 
than the tax on nitrogen. This provides an additional advantage for this policy as well. On the 
other hand, the tax interaction effect is larger under the tax on output, because it raises the price 
of the dirty good faster. This is a major disadvantage for this policy in the second best. The 
magnitudes of the income replacement effects of these policies also matter, but it is difficult to 
compare them without more simplifying assumptions.  
  20In general, in the second best setting, whether the tax on output of the dirty good is more or less 
efficient than the tax on nitrogen depends on the magnitudes of the primary and secondary 
impacts of these policies.  
3.7.4. The Two-Part Instrument  
Consider now a revenue neutral subsidy reform in agriculture. Suppose the government 
reduces the distortionary agricultural support subsidies per unit of agricultural good and uses 
released revenues to increase the nitrogen run-off reduction subsidies. Indeed, this is a 
combination of an output tax and a nitrogen run-off reduction subsidy. This reform is similar to 
the two-part instrument which is suggested by Fullerton (1997). Fullerton has suggested a tax on 
output plus a subsidy to all clean inputs but the two-part instrument in this paper is a tax on 
output plus a nitrogen run-off reduction subsidy.  
Here it is assumed that . This means that the government does not use 
released revenues to cut income taxes. The welfare impacts of this reform are presented in 
equation (3-31).  
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    (3-31) 
A comparison of  (3-22) and (3-27) with (3-31) indicates that the tax on nitrogen, the nitrogen 
reduction subsidy, and the two-part instrument generate similar primary effects.   
The comparison also reveals that the tax on nitrogen generates revenue recycling effect, the 
nitrogen reduction subsidy generates reverse revenue recycling effect, and the two-part 
instrument does not generate the revenue recycling effect. Hence, from this perspective, the two-
part policy is more costly than the nitrogen run-off tax but is more efficient than the nitrogen 
  21run-off reduction subsidy. In addition, the two-part instrument generates weaker price support 
effect because under this policy the price support effect does not scaled by (1+M).  
While the two-part instrument does not generate a revenue recycling effect and it has weaker 
price support effect, it can be argued that the tax interaction effect and the income replacement 
effect under this policy are smaller than the corresponding effects under the nitrogen run-off tax 
and the nitrogen reduction subsidy. Under the latter policies, the tax interaction effect and the 
income replacement effect are enlarged by the marginal cost of public funds. The two-part 
instrument generates moderate secondary impacts because it does not seriously affect the labor 
market. This argument is confirmed by the simulation results later.   
In short, it is reasonable to argue that the overall welfare impact of the two-part instrument is less 
than the overall impact of the tax on nitrogen and more than the overall impact of the nitrogen 
reduction subsidy. This argument is also confirmed by the simulation results.  
3.7.5. Land Retirement 
Suppose that the government wants to reduce nitrogen run-off by retiring some land. The 
government can finance this policy by taxing sources of incomes and/or reducing subsidies per 
unit of output. Assume that the government rents land from the owner (the consumer) at the 
market price and assume total expenditure of this policy equals to . Here,  RG rR G R  stands for the 
retired lands. The government budget constraint for this policy is: 
LR RK K R G o tL trR trK rR SX G ++ = + +       (3-32) 
Under this policy, the farmer does not have an incentive to reduce nitrogen run-off per unit of 
output because it does not change the price of the polluting input. Under this policy the price of 
the dirty good would be equal to:  
(,, ) XX R K No p Cr rp S =−    (3-33) 
The welfare impacts of an incremental change in the retired lands are presented and labeled in 
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Equation (3-34) indicates that the primary Pigouvian effect of this policy equals to the value of 
marginal product of land. Comparing with the nitrogen run-off tax, the land retirement generates 
higher primary Pigouvian effect because this policy does not force farmers to reduce nitrogen  
run-off per unit of output. This policy raises the rental rate of land, because endowment of land is 
fixed and taking away some land from production raises the marginal product of the active land. 
When land and other inputs,  in particular nitrogen, are substitutable then an increase in the rental 
rate of land forces farmers to use more capital, labor, or even more nitrogen fertilizer per unit of 
output. The government can also generate an incentive for farmers to transfer some land from 
sector Y to sector X, if targets only planted land in sector X. Therefore, this policy does not 
reduce used nitrogen per unit of output when nitrogen fertilizer and other inputs are substitutable. 
Indeed, this policy restricts both sectors because reduction in land raises prices of capital and 
land and both sectors suffer from this policy. Therefore, as long as land and other inputs are 
substitutable land retirement fails to reduce nitrogen per unit of output. This raises the cost of 
this policy significantly. When inputs are complements and it is not possible to substitute 
nitrogen with other inputs then the land retirement can be considered as an attractive policy.  
  234. The Numerical Model 
The numerical model follows the analytical model and it depicts the US economy at a 
macro level. The representative consumer derives utility from goods and leisure according to the 
following two-level constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function: 
1 1
11 1 1
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− ,    (4-1) 
In this utility function u σ is the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption goods, 
C σ is the elasticity of substitution between the two consumption goods, l α and  X α are distribution 
parameters, ϕ indicates marginal utility of the reserve, and φ  indicates marginal damage of 
nitrogen run-off.  
We model production processes with the two-level production functions. Sato (1967) originally 
introduced this type of production function. The two-level production functions have been 
widely used in literature
19. This type of production function provides a simple and convenient 
way to build up CES production functions with more than two factors of production. In a two-
level production function, first, production is a function of two composite inputs: which are 
called mechanical and biological inputs. Second, production of each composite input is a 
function of two inputs. The biological input is a function of land and fertilizer and the 
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19 Examples are Binswanger 1974, Kawagoe et al. 1985, Thirtle 1985, Abler and Shortle 1992.   
  24Where Oi,  i B , and i M represent outputs of final goods, the composite biological inputs, and the 

























= . Where  ii σ are the 
elasticities of substitution between the biological and the mechanical inputs, Bi σ are the 
elasticities of substitution between land and nitrogen and Mi σ are the elasticities of substitution 
between labor and capital. It is assumed that production of Y does not need nitrogen. This implies 
that  1 BY α = which in turn implies YB Y Y B R γ = .  
The numerical model and calibration process are described in Taheripour (2005) in detail. In the 
rest of this section the benchmark data and simulation results are presented. 
4.1. The Data 
Table 1 summarizes the data, which depicts the US economy in 2002. In this table, the 
US economy is divided into two sectors: a dirty sector, which produces crops and a clean sector 
which provides other goods and services. Taheripour (2005) describes the benchmark data in 
more detail. In addition to the benchmark data, some parameters are taken from the literature. 
The uncompensated labor supply elasticity of  0.15 L e =  is taken from Goulder et al. (1999). The 
price elasticity of  is assigned to the demand of the clean good based on the work of 
Kyer and Maggs (1997). Their work indicates that the price elasticity of aggregate demand for 
the US economy was around 1.0 during the time period of 1965-90. This value is adopted 
because the clean good approximately represents the aggregate demand for the US economy. 
Based on the Database for Trade Liberalization Studies
20, the price elasticity of   is 
assigned to the domestic demand of the dirty good. This number represents an inelastic demand 
for crop products. Many papers report inelastic demand for food and for agricultural products
 21. 
Finally, we assume that the elasticity of demand for crop products in the world market is equal 
to
1.0
Y p e =
0.5
X p e =
0.9 x ε = . These elasticities are used to calibrate parameters of the utility function. In addition, 
elasticities of substitution in the production functions are taken from Balisteri et al. (2002) and 
                                                           
20 See Sullivan et al. (1989)  
21 For example see Yen et al. (2003) 
  25Horan et al. (2002). They are shown in table 2. We also do sensitivity analyses to check how 
results change due to changes in the selected parameters.   
4.2. Simulation results 
The numerical model is solved for several values of nitrogen reduction targets (from 0 to 
50 percent) under each of the alternative policies in the first and second best settings. Simulation 
results indicate that all policies can reduce consumption of nitrogen except for the land 
retirement. This policy fails to reduce consumption of nitrogen for two reasons. First, it fails to 
discourage consumption of the dirty good. Second, it encourages farmers to use more nitrogen 
per unit of output. Since nitrogen fertilizer and land are substitutable, imposing any restriction on 
land raises consumption of nitrogen fertilizer per unit of output. Therefore, the early conclusion 
is that the land retirement is the worst policy among alternative policies. The rest of this section 
considers the land retirement as an ineffective policy and emphasizes the welfare impacts of the 
remaining policies.  
To facilitate the comparison among alternative policies, an equivalent variation measure (EV) 
with the following extended definition
22 is calculated
23 for each level of nitrogen reduction 
target:  
01 00 (,) (,) EV e p u e p u =−,  and .  
00 (,) uv p m =
0 1 11 (,) uv p m =
Here and  stand for the expenditure and indirect utility functions,  ( , ) e ( , ) v
0 p and 
1 p represent 
vectors of prices (including prices of inputs) in the absence and presence of environmental 
regulation, and  and   indicate wealth in the absence and presence of environmental 
regulation, respectively. In this definition, wealth includes all types of income, leisure and trade 
reserves. This definition captures changes in both the prices and wealth. In this definition, a 
positive amount of EV represents welfare gain. The calculated EVs for the alternative policies in 





                                                           
22 This definition is designed based on the question 3.I.12 of Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995).   
  264.2.1. Costs of Policies in the First Best 
The welfare impacts of the alternative policies for several values of nitrogen reduction 
targets in the first best setting are depicted in figure 1. This figure indicates that in the first best 
setting, the tax on nitrogen-run off and the nitrogen reduction subsidy are identical
24.  In 
addition, figure 1 indicates in the first best setting all policies generate some welfare gains at low 
levels of nitrogen reduction targets. That is, we observe gains for levels below 40 percent for the 
nitrogen run-off tax, below, 36 percent for the tax on production, and finally below 46 percent 
for the two part instrument. The maximum amounts of gains that these policies generate are 
about $470 million, $1600 million, and $550 million, respectively. These numbers appear at 22 
percent, 20 percent, and 26 percent levels of nitrogen reduction targets, respectively. As figure 1 
indicates, gains increase with the level of nitrogen reduction target until they reach to their 
maximum point. After that, gains decrease as the level of nitrogen reduction target goes up. 
Recall from the analytical model, alternative policies generate two effects in the first best setting: 
the Pigouvian and trade effects. As it is explained in section 3, the Pigouvian effect reduces 
welfare and the trade effect improves it. The numerical results indicate that at lower levels of 
nitrogen reduction, the primary trade effect is larger than the primary Pigouvian effect. This 
relationship is reversed at higher levels of nitrogen reduction targets. This indicates that the 
Pigouvian effect grows faster than the trade effect as the level of nitrogen reduction target goes 
up. The extra gains at lower levels of nitrogen reduction generate a double dividend.   
Figure 1 also reveals that the tax on the production of the dirty good is the most efficient policy 
at lower levels of nitrogen reduction targets, but is the worst one at higher levels. This policy is 
the most efficient policy at lower levels of nitrogen reduction targets because it raises the price of 
the dirty good sharply and generates a large trade effect at these levels. The trade effects of the 
other policies are not that large because they raise the price of the dirty good moderately. The tax 
on the production of the dirty good is the worst policy at higher levels of nitrogen reduction 
targets because unlike the other policies it does not encourage producers to use less nitrogen per 
unit of output. Reduction in consumption of nitrogen under this policy is due to substitution in 
consumption only. This imposes a considerable amount of cost at higher levels of nitrogen 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
() E
23 In this calculation benefits from changes inφ are ignored. Indeed, the first dividend is not included in the 
definition of EV.      
24 Note that there is no entry and exit in this economy.   
  27reduction targets. Finally, figure 1 indicates that the two-part instrument is slightly more efficient 
than the nitrogen run-off tax.  
4.2.2. Costs of Policies in the Second Best 
To facilitate comparison between the first and second best results, the overall welfare 
impacts of the alternative policies in the second best world are depicted in figure 2. A 
comparison of the second best with the first best welfare impacts of the alternative policies 
reveals that:  
- In the second best the tax on nitrogen run-off and the nitrogen run-off reduction subsidy are in 
their welfare impacts. In the second best setting the former policy is more efficient than the latter 
one.   
- In the second best, similar to the first best, alternative policies enhance welfare until they reach 
some levels of nitrogen reduction targets, at which point they become costly. In the second best 
setting, we observe gains for levels below 38 percent for the nitrogen run-off tax, below 20 
percent for the nitrogen run-off reduction subsidy, below 40 percent for the tax on production, 
and finally below 26 percent for the two-part instrument. The maximum amounts of gains that 
these policies generate are about $500 million, $140 million, $2448 million, and $187 million, 
respectively. These numbers appear at 20 percent, 10 percent, 22 percent, and 14 percent levels 
of nitrogen reduction targets, respectively.   
- At low/high levels of nitrogen reduction targets, alternative policies generate more gains/costs  
in the second best than the first best.  
- In the second best, similar to the first best, the tax on production of the dirty good is the most 
efficient policy until its turning point. After that, this policy is the worst one and the tax on 
nitrogen is the best policy.   
- Regardless of the tax on production, the tax on nitrogen is the best and the nitrogen reduction 
subsidy is the worst policy at all levels of nitrogen reduction in the second best. The two part 
instrument is always placed in between these two policies.  
  28At low levels of nitrogen reduction targets, the tax on production and the tax on nitrogen perform 
better than other policies in the second best. This is because of the following reasons. First, these 
policies raise government revenues and generate revenue recycling effect. Second, they reduce 
government expenditures due to reduction in costs of price support program and accelerate the 
revenue recycling effect. Third, they raise the price of the dirty good and reduce pre-existence 
distortionary effects of the price support programs. The last reason also explains why the tax on 
production generates considerable gains at lower levels of nitrogen reduction targets. The price 
support program which indeed is a negative tax on production is a distortionary policy by itself 
regardless of its impacts on the government budget constraint. The tax on production indeed 
eliminates all distortionary impacts of this program at lower levels of nitrogen reduction targets 
which makes this policy more efficient at lower levels of nitrogen reduction.  
Finally, while the tax on nitrogen is more efficient than the two-part instrument at all levels of 
nitrogen reduction targets, the difference between the welfare impacts of these policies is not that 
large especially at the lower levels of nitrogen reduction targets. The difference between the 
welfare impacts of these policies is significant only at very high levels of nitrogen reduction 
targets. This means that the two-part instrument is an appropriate instrument when the tax on 
nitrogen run-off is not available.  
5. Sensitivity analysis 
To test impacts of alternative parameterizations on the simulation results, three more sets 
of parameters are tested. In the first set, the elasticity of labor supply is reduced from 0.15 to 
0.11. This affects calibrated parameters of the utility function. In the second set, the elasticity of 
substitution between land and nitrogen fertilizer in production of the dirty good is reduced from 
1.25 to 0.75. This affects the calibrated parameters in sector X. In the third set, we test several 
values for the elasticity of demand for exports of the dirty good. In the base case scenarios, we 
assumed that 0.9 x ε = . We test sensitivity of the results to this parameter for 1 x ε = and 1.1 x ε = .   
In short, a reduction in the elasticity of labor supply (from 0.15 to 0.11) reduces economic gains 
of the tax on production and increases gains of other alternative policies. In addition, reduction in 
the elasticity of labor supply changes the relative efficiency of alternative policies in favor of the 
nitrogen reduction subsidy and the two-part instrument. A reduction in the elasticity of 
  29substitution between land and nitrogen fertilizer (from 1.25 to 0.75) makes substitution between 
nitrogen and land difficult and raises the costs of all policies at high levels of nitrogen reduction 
targets significantly. Finally, results are not sensitive to the elasticity of demand for exports of 
the dirty good. 
6. Conclusion  
This paper has considered the choice between alternative instrument policies for 
environmental regulation in agriculture in an open economy in the second best setting, where 
there exist distortionary factor taxes and distortionary agricultural support subsidies. It has 
developed analytical and numerical models to assess and compare welfare impacts of five 
policies: a nitrogen run-off tax, a nitrogen run-off reduction subsidy, a tax on the production of 
agricultural goods, land retirement, and a “two-part” instrument - a combination of the second 
and the third policies.  
The paper finds that when nitrogen and other inputs, in particular land, are substitutable then the 
land retirement is the worst policy among alternative policies. The paper indicates that all 
alternative policies, except land retirement, may generate a double dividend because of 
agricultural support subsidies and exports of agricultural products. 
The numerical results indicate that all alternative policies, except land retirement, generate some 
gains at lower levels of nitrogen reduction targets in the first and second best settings. Gains are 
higher in the second best. At higher levels of nitrogen reduction target all policies become costly 
and impose more costs in the second best. The relative efficiency of alternative policies is 
sensitive to the level of the nitrogen reduction target. For example, the tax on the production of 
the dirty agricultural good is the most efficient policy at lower levels of nitrogen reduction 
targets, but is the worst at higher levels. 
Finally, the paper indicates that the difference between the welfare impacts of the tax on nitrogen 
run-off and the two-part instrument is insignificant, in particular at low levels of nitrogen 
reduction targets. This asserts that the government can use the two-part instrument to control 
non-observable nitrogen run-off in agriculture.    
 
  30Table 1. Benchmark data (in millions of 2002 dollars except as otherwise noted) 
Description Dirty  Good  Clean  Good  Total 
Value added at the producer price  87718  8908190  8995908 
Subsidy (the price support)  9513  0  9513 
Value added at the consumer price  78205  8908190  8986395 
Export (payments for fertilizer)  15168  0  15168 
Consumption at the consumer price  63037  8908190  8971228 
Consumption at the producer price  70705  8908190  8978896 
Leisure  0 0 2871434 
Labor income  20894  5139655  5160549 
Land income  27462  9912  37373 
Capital income  24194  3758624  3782818 
Land (million acres)  341  1222  1563 
Homogenized land (million acres)  1148  415  1563 
Capital stock  585325  22827675  23413000 
Homogenized capital   149744  23263256  23413000 
Fertilizer (nitrogen content in million metric tons)  12     12 
Mechanical inputs  45089  8898279  8943367 
Biological inputs  42629  9912  52541 
Marginal income tax rate (percent)        40 
Government expenditures (G)        1595427 
Source: Taheripour (2005). 
Table 2. Selected Parameters  
Description of Parameter  Value  Source 
Uncompensated labor supply elasticity  0.15  Goulder (1999) 
Uncompensated price elasticity of demand for 
the dirty good 
0.5  Steven et al. (2003) 
Uncompensated price elasticity of demand for 
the clean good 
1.0  Kyer and Maggs (1997)
Elasticity of substitution between the biological 
and the mechanical inputs in production of X 
0.5  Horan et al. (2002) 
Elasticity of substitution between land and 
nitrogen fertilizer in production of X 
1.25  Horan et al. (2002) 
Elasticity of substitution between labor and 
capital in production of X 
0.585  Balisteri et al. (2002) 
Elasticity of substitution between the biological 
and the mechanical inputs in production of Y 
0.5  Horan et al. (2002) 
Elasticity of substitution between labor and 
capital in production of Y 
0.951  Balisteri et al. (2002) 
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